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Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards and Corporate Value:
A Cross-Country Analysis

Abstract
We investigate the relation between corporate value and the fraction of independent
directors in 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 countries. We find a
positive relation, especially in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. The
findings suggest that a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could offset, at least in
part, the documented value discount associated with weak country-level shareholder
protection by appointing an ‘independent’ board. The cost to the dominant shareholder
of doing so is the loss in perquisites associated with being a dominant shareholder. Thus,
not all dominant shareholders will choose independent boards.

Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards and Corporate Value:
A Cross-Country Analysis

This paper is an empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate
value and board composition in firms with a dominant shareholder.

The question

addressed is whether a ‘strong’ board can offset the market value discount in firms
domiciled in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. Such a discount has
been documented by Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (CDFL) (2002), Durnev and
Kim (DK) (2005), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (2002).
This discount is often attributed to the ability of a dominant shareholder to divert
corporate resources from other shareholders to himself for personal consumption,
especially in countries with weak legal shareholder protection. In essence, the question
that we address is whether a dominant shareholder could, were he so inclined, increase
firm value by appointing a ‘strong’ board with a mandate of assuring minority investors
that he will refrain from diversion of the firm’s resources and whether the effect of board
composition on firm value, if there is any, is different between countries with weak and
those with strong legal shareholder protection.
The studies most closely related to ours are Durnev and Kim (DK) (2005) and
Klapper and Love (KL) (2004).

Among other things, these studies empirically

investigate the relationship between firm value and the ‘quality’ of a firm’s corporate
governance where the proxies for the quality of governance are two firm-specific indices:
the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) corporate governance scores and the
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) transparency rankings. As do the other studies cited above,
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these two report that proxies for Tobin’s Q (i.e., firm market-to-book value ratios) are
lower in countries with weak legal shareholder protection. They further report, however,
that the value discount is less in firms with higher corporate governance scores. We
complement these studies by exploring what role, if any, the composition of the board of
directors has in reducing the value discount in firms with a dominant shareholder across
countries with strong and weak legal shareholder protection.
The premise underlying our analysis goes as follows. Dominant shareholders
have an incentive and, in the absence of a countervailing force, the ability to divert
corporate resources from other shareholders to themselves for personal consumption.
Such diversion reduces the observed market value of the firm.

In some instances,

however, a dominant shareholder may be willing to reduce his diversion of corporate
resources in exchange for an increase in firm value. The most likely instance in which
this will occur is when the dominant shareholder wishes to sell equity either on personal
account (for diversification or consumption purposes) or through the firm (to undertake
positive NPV projects).
The problem for the dominant shareholder is convincing minority shareholders
that he will refrain from diverting resources. We propose that one way in which he can
do so is by appointing a ‘strong’ board of directors charged with a mandate of curbing the
dominant shareholder’s diversion of corporate resources. This proposition raises, at least,
three related questions.
First, can the appointment of a ‘strong’ board be an effective deterrent to resource
diversion given that the dominant shareholder can just as easily remove directors as
appoint them? In such circumstances, appointment of a strong board would be unlikely
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to increase firm value. A counter argument is that, at the margin, if replacement of strong
directors is costly to the dominant shareholder for any reason, appointment of a strong
board could at least ameliorate the loss in value associated with a firm having a dominant
shareholder.
And that leads to the second question - - what incentive does a director have to
monitor a dominant shareholder who can replace him? That is, even if there are marginal
costs to the dominant shareholder of replacing directors who monitor him too closely,
what incentives do such directors have to monitor?
The answer to this question lies in the market for directors. As Fama and Jensen
(1983) argue “[e]ffective separation of top-level decision management and control means
that outside directors have incentives to carry out their tasks and not collude with
managers to expropriate residual claimants … .”1 The incentive arises because “…there
is substantial devaluation of human capital when internal control breaks down...”2 Given
a market for outside directors occurs, the failure to monitor implies a loss in human
capital for ineffective directors. This argument holds together only so long as a market
for outside directors occurs.
The third question is - - what power does an outside director have to control the
dominant shareholder even if he does choose to be an effective monitor?
directors may derive their power legally, contractually or implicitly.

Outside

As we will

document, in many of the countries in our sample, directors have a legal responsibility to
monitor on behalf of minority shareholders, but that may not be the primary source of
their power. Rather, assuming that directors suffer losses in human capital when they fail

1
2

Fama and Jensen (1983), p. 315.
Ibid, p. 315.
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to monitor, ex ante, directors will seek assurances, either contractually or implicitly, from
the dominant shareholder that they will have the freedom to monitor effectively.
Our foregoing discussion frames the issues that we address empirically. We
conduct our analysis with data on boards of directors for 799 firms with dominant
shareholders from 22 countries. We classify directors as ‘affiliated’ with the dominant
shareholder or ‘independent.’ We use an expansive definition of affiliated such that
affiliated directors encompass more than just the executives of the firm and our definition
of an independent director is narrower than ‘outside’ directors where any non-executive
is typically considered an outside director. We find that there does appear to be a robust
market for independent directors - - of the XX independent directors in our sample, XX%
of them serve on multiple boards.
We also find that firms with independent boards are significantly more likely to
issue equity than are other firms in our sample. Thus, the demand to sell shares appears
to be a determinant of board composition. These two sets of results provide a foundation
for our primary analysis.
In our primary analysis, we estimate regressions in which the dependent variable
is firms’ market-to-book value ratios (as a proxy for Tobin’s Qs) and the independent
variables are country levels of shareholder protection, the fraction of the board made up
of independent directors, and various control variables.
Consistent with prior studies, we find that Q ratios are positively correlated with
the country level of legal shareholder protection: on average, lower country levels of
legal shareholder protection are associated with lower market-to-book ratios. We also
find that, after controlling for country-level of legal shareholder protection (and other
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factors), Qs are positively correlated with the fraction of the board composed of
independent directors: a higher fraction of independent directors is associated with a
higher Q ratio. Further, we find that the relationship between market-to-book ratios and
the fraction of independent directors is stronger in countries with weaker legal protection
for shareholders.
As a final step in our analysis, we seek to identify evidence of ways in which
independent directors constrain resource diversion by dominant shareholders. Perhaps
the most frequently cited mechanism through which dominant shareholders are alleged to
divert resources is by arranging disadvantageous transactions between the publicly traded
firms that they control and other firms also controlled by the dominant shareholder in
which the dominant shareholder has a larger ownership position. Such deals are referred
to as related party transactions and the diversion of resources in this way is often labeled
tunneling.
We examine the occurrence of related party transactions by the firms in our
sample with a regression analysis. After controlling for other factors, the occurrence of
related party transactions is negatively correlated with the fraction of the board
comprising independent directors: a higher proportion of independent directors is
associated with a lower likelihood of a related party transaction.
Thus, the evidence indicates that a dominant shareholder is more likely to appoint
independent directors when his firm intends to issue equity, that a higher proportion of
independent directors is associated with a lower incidence of related party transactions,
that firms without related party transactions have higher values than firms with related
party transactions and that firm values are positively correlated with the proportion of
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independent directors comprising the board. Finally, each of these relationships is more
significant in countries with weak legal protection for outside shareholders.
Fundamental to the interpretation of our results is the assumption that
‘independent’ directors lead to a ‘stronger’ board. Accepting that assumption as true, our
results imply that stronger boards are associated with higher equity values in firms with a
dominant shareholder and this relationship is more consequential in countries with weak
shareholder legal protection. Numerical analysis indicates that this relationship is not
only statistically but also economically significant especially in countries with weak legal
protection for shareholders.
Our study contributes to the literature on the effect of country-level legal systems
on corporate activities and corporate value (e.g., Beck, Levine & Loayza (2000),
Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003), Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (JBBF)
(2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), LLSV (1997, 1999, 2002), and Rajan and Zingales
(1998) among others), to the literature on the effect of board composition on corporate
value and performance (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber (AK) (1996, 2001), Bhagat and Black
(BB) (2002), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2005), Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002),
and Hermalin and Weisbach (HW) (1991, 2003), among others), and, peripherally, to the
literature on the value of shareholder voting rights (e.g., Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1992),
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Grossman and Hart (1988), Lease, McConnell, and
Mikkelson (1983, 1984), and Zingales (1994) among others).
Section I presents the background and motivation for this study along with a
review of related literature. Section II describes the data collection procedures and gives
certain descriptive statistics for the sample. Section III presents univariate tests of the
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relationship between Q and the percentage of the board composed of independent
directors. Section IV presents multivariate tests of this relationship. Section V presents
the results of various tests of robustness including instrumental variable regressions that
control for the possible endogeneity between board composition and firm value and
variations in empirical procedures and variable specifications. Section VI provides a
commentary on the results and concludes.
I.

Background and Related Literature
It is well documented that, in most countries, large publicly traded firms are not

widely held. Rather, ownership and control of such firms typically vest with a dominant
shareholder.3 Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (1999), Davies (2000), Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) and others argue that, in such firms, the primary agency conflict is not
between owners and managers, but between the dominant shareholder, who has the
power to divert corporate resources to himself, and other shareholders. DK (2005),
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (DKS) (2004a) and LLSV (2002) further observe that this
agency conflict is likely to be most acute in countries that afford weak legal protection to
minority shareholders. This occurs because, in such countries, it is argued, the dominant
shareholder has greater ability to extract resources that otherwise would have been shared
with minority investors.
LLSV (2002) go on to develop a model in which firm value depends upon the
profits generated by the firm, the amount of profits diverted from productive use by the
dominant shareholder, and the cost of diverting profits. They assume that the cost of
diversion is greater in countries with stronger shareholder protection. As a consequence,

3

For example, in La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, and Shleifer (LLS) (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang
(CDL) (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002).
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less diversion occurs and firm value is higher. DK (2005), LLSV (2002), and Lins
(2003) conduct empirical investigations and report that Tobin’s Q are higher in countries
with stronger country-level legal shareholder protection. These results support the LLSV
analysis.
In the LLSV (2002) model, the dominant shareholder is largely at the mercy of
the legal environment in which his firm resides. That is, given his level of ownership, the
model does not afford the dominant shareholder the ability to provide extra-legal
assurances to outside investors that he will not divert resources. The result is that the
level of diversion and, therefore, the loss in value due to diversion is beyond the control
of the dominant shareholder.
DK (2005) and DKS (2004a,b) present models in which the dominant shareholder
can take steps to overcome the loss in value associated with weak country-level legal
shareholder protection. These steps involve a commitment on the part of the dominant
shareholder to curtail his future diversion of corporate resources for personal
consumption. In the DKS (2004b) model, the dominant shareholder can choose to list the
shares of his firm on the stock exchange of a country with stronger legal shareholder
protection. Doing so reduces the dominant shareholder’s ability to divert corporate
resources (i.e., raises the costs of diversion) and, thereby, raises the firm’s equity value.
Benos and Weisbach (BW) (2004), Siegel (2005), Stulz (1999), and Reese and Weisbach
(RW) (2002) present similar arguments. DKS (2004b), Miller (1999), and RW (2002)
report empirical evidence consistent with this argument.
In the DK (2005) and DKS (2004a) models, the dominant shareholder can choose
a higher ‘quality’ of internal corporate governance for his firm. As with a cross-border
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listing to a country with stronger legal protection, the higher quality of governance
increases the cost of diversion to the dominant shareholder with the consequence that less
diversion occurs and firm value is higher. DK (2005) and KL (2004) estimate cross-firm
cross-country regressions in which proxies for firms’ Tobin’s Qs are the dependent
variable and the independent variables include an index of country-level legal
shareholder protection along with measures of the firm-specific ‘quality’ of corporate
governance. As proxies for the quality of corporate governance they use the CLSA
corporate governance scores and the S&P transparency rankings. The results of their
analyses support the DK (2005) and DKS (2004a) models in that market-to-book asset
ratios are positively correlated with the country-level of legal shareholder protection and
with the firm-specific measures of the quality of corporate governance. The implication
is that a dominant shareholder can increase the value of his firm by improving the quality
of his firm’s internal governance mechanisms even in countries with weak legal
shareholder protection.
Our study complements the DK (2005) and KL (2004) analyses by focusing on
the firm’s board of directors. Arguably the board of directors is a central building block
of a firm’s corporate governance structure. Indeed, both the CLSA and the S&P scores
give weight to qualitative and quantitative board characteristics.4
It is not unreasonable to expect that a ‘stronger’ board could offset, at least in
part, the loss in value associated with weak country-level legal shareholder protection. A
‘strong’ board endowed with a mandate to monitor the dominant shareholder on behalf of
4

For example, the CLSA index is based on the answers by financial analysts to 70 questions. The survey
includes such questions as “Is it true that there has been no controversy or question raised over whether the
board or senior management have made decisions in the past 5 years that benefit them, at the expense of
shareholders?” And “Does the company have an audit committee … chaired by a perceived genuine
independent director?”
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minority shareholders could raise the cost of diversion to the dominant shareholder and,
thereby, reduce diversion and increase value. There is, however, a reasonable argument
that appointment of a ‘strong’ board will have little or no effect on corporate value.
Specifically, Bebchuk (1999) argues that certain actions by the dominant
shareholder that are apparently designed to curb his diversion of private benefits are
unlikely to provide concrete assurances to outside shareholders.

Appointment of a

‘strong’ board, for example, may be ineffective because a dominant shareholder can
easily replace strong directors with weak ones, and this is may be especially so in
countries with weak legal shareholder protection.5 The result is that appointment of a
strong board in such circumstances will not increase firm value. The opposing argument
is that, at the margin, if replacement of strong directors is costly at all, appointment of a
strong board could at least reduce the loss in value associated with a firm having a
dominant shareholder.
As we noted at the outset a positive marginal cost for removing strong directors is
not in itself sufficient to increase firm value. Directors must also have an incentive and
the power to influence the actions of the dominant shareholder. As regards the incentive,
if there is a market for directors and if poor performance by a director reduces the value
of his human capital, then directors will have an incentive to monitor the dominant
shareholder. The evidence on this issue is mixed. On the one hand, studies by Coles and
Hoi (2003), Gilson (1990), Harford (2003), and Kaplan and Reishaus (1990) indicate that
the number of boards on which a director sits is positively related to the performance of
the firms on which an incumbent director sits. On the other hand, studies by Core,

5

Similar arguments apply to cross-listings. According to Nasdaq data, several hundred foreign firms
delisted over the period 2000-2004.
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Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggest that firm
performance suffers when outside director sit on “too many” boards. The former studies
appear to imply that strong board oversight is rewarded with more board appointments,
while the latter studies appear to suggest the opposite.
As for the power to curb the dominant shareholder’s diversion, such power can
arise from legal, contractual or implicit constructs. As we will document, in many of the
countries in our sample directors have a legal responsibility to monitor on behalf of
minority shareholders. But the primary source of their power may come from their
explicit and implicit negotiations with the dominant shareholder prior to their
appointment. Assuming that directors suffer losses in their reputational capital when they
fail to curb the dominant shareholder’s actions, outside directors will demand upfront
assurances that they will have the power to monitor effectively. And although we do not
have large sample evidence to support that presumption, we have come across at least
some anecdotal evidence: In 2003, the board of Hollinger International (HI) ousted its
chairman, Conrad Black, and sued him for $200 million for misuse of funds. At the time,
Black owned 17% of the shares of Hollinger Inc.6 which owned 30% of the cash flow
rights and 78% of the voting rights of HI.
Of course, the actions of the board need not be as dramatic as in HI to have an
effect. The appropriate benchmark for judging whether a board has the power to reduce
diversion of resources is not whether a ‘strong’ board can monitor the dominant
shareholder perfectly, the benchmark is whether the board can reduce diversion of
resources relative to a ‘weak’ board in the otherwise identical circumstances.

6

And 84% of the voting rights through Ravleston corporation.
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As regards the demand by dominant shareholders for a strong board, we have
argued that such a demand is most likely to arise when the dominant shareholder wishes
to sell shares either on personal account or through his firm. That is, only when the
dominant shareholder wishes to sell shares will he be concerned abut the market value of
his firm. Consistent with the idea that better governance at the firm level is associated
with the demand for capital, DK (2005) find a positive correlation between the “need for
funds” and CLSA scores. Similarly, RW (2002) find that firms that cross-list their stock
on U.S. exchanges increase their equity issues following listing and that this increase is
greatest for cross-listings from countries with weak legal shareholder protection.
How strong boards curtail a dominant shareholder’s ability to divert is difficult to
identify precisely.

Presumably, if they do so, it is through an ongoing process of

monitoring and control. However, one way in which dominant shareholders are alleged
to divert is through related party transactions.

In such transactions, the dominant

shareholder arranges a deal between two companies in which he holds a controlling
interest. He arranges the deal so as to provide favorable terms to the firm in which he has
a larger percentage equity ownership and disadvantageous terms to the firm in which he
holds a smaller ownership position.
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathn (2002) report evidence of evidence of transfers
among Indian pyramidal firms consistent with wealth transfers from firms lower down
the pyramid to firms higher up the ownership chain in which the dominant shareholder
has alarger ownership position.

Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) find that dominant

shareholders in Korean chaebol firms gain when a chaebol-affiliated firm undertakes an
acquisition while minority shareholders in the chaebol lose. Cheung, Jing, Rau and
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Stouraitis (2006) find that in China local governments extract resources from publicly
traded firms in which they have significant ownership positions by entering into contracts
on terms disadvantageous to the publicly traded enterprise.7 Perhaps a board composed
of directors independent of the government can reduce such disadvantageous
transactions.
Given the potentially pivotal role of the board in assuring higher quality
governance and given competing arguments regarding the valuation effects of an
apparently ‘strong’ board, we set out to examine whether firm value is higher in firms
with a dominant shareholder that have ‘stronger’ boards and whether the relation between
firm value and board structure is different in countries with low versus high levels of
legal shareholder protection. That is, we are asking whether a dominant shareholder who
desires to increase the market value of his firm could do so by appointing more
‘independent’ directors and whether such a decision has more effect in a country that
provides weak as opposed to strong legal protection for shareholders.
As corollary issues, we also investigate whether the directors in our sample
appear to have reputational capital at risk, whether there is a correlation between the
fraction of the board made up of independent directors and the propensity of the firm to
issue equity, whether the market value of firms with related party transactions is different
from the market value of other firms, and whether the occurrence of related party
transactions is correlated with the proportion of the board composed of independent
directors.
II.

7

Sampling Procedure and Data

Other studies of related party transactions include Atanasov (2005), Cheung, Rau and Stouratis (2005),
and Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) among others.
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II.A

Firms and dominant shareholders
To conduct our empirical analysis, we assemble data on share ownership and

boards of directors for firms from the 22 countries listed in table I.8 These are the
countries for which we have been able to locate data on both variables.9
Our first task is to identify firms with a dominant shareholder where a dominant
shareholder is one who can significantly influence selection of the firm’s board. While it
is possible, and perhaps likely, that in some cases, more than one large shareholder can
influence the composition of the board, we assume that the firm has a single influential or
dominant shareholder. Thus, we search for the largest single owner of voting rights in
each firm provided that the shareholder controls at least 10% of the firm’s votes.
Further, we are interested in the firm’s ‘ultimate’ shareholder so as to be able to
identify directors affiliated with this ultimate owner. As has been widely documented,
many publicly-traded firms are controlled through pyramidal ownership structures (e.g.,
CDL (2000) and LLS (1999) and others). For that reason, we trace the ownership of
voting rights through an ownership “tree” to identify an ultimate owner. We consider a
shareholder of Company A to be an ultimate owner when the shareholder is an individual
or a family, a privately-held operating company, a privately-held financial firm, or a
government. Additionally, when the shares of Company A are owned by a publiclytraded corporation, Company B, that has a shareholder with 10% or more of voting rights
in one of these categories, that shareholder is considered to be the dominant shareholder
8

The countries are mostly economically developed. To the extent that shareholder protection fosters
economic development, the countries in our sample will have less dispersion on this dimension than a
broader sample and, as such, the tests may be biased against the finding of any effect of board composition
on corporate value.
9
The key factor limiting our analysis to companies from 22 countries listed in table I is data on board
members. In 14 additional countries, we are able to locate ownership data for the 70 largest companies but
are unable to find information on board membership.
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of Companies A and B. If the shares in Company A are held by Company B and
Company B has no dominant shareholder, then Company A is also considered to have no
dominant shareholder. Once an ultimate dominant shareholder has been identified, we
search to identify affiliations between that shareholder and members of the firm’s board.
To assemble our sample, for each country listed in table I, we identify the largest
publicly-traded industrial companies in terms of equity market capitalization as of
December 2002 included in Worldscope with up to a maximum of 70 companies in any
one country.10 Worldscope does not list 70 such companies for Korea, Mexico and South
Africa. For these countries, we have 29, 40 and 56 firms, respectively, resulting in an
initial sample of 1,455 firms.
For each firm, for which data are available as of year-end 2002, we extract the
identity and percentage voting rights of each shareholder who holds more than 10% of
the voting rights outstanding from the sources listed in Appendix A. Certain of the data
sources are country specific. The sources are listed in the order in which they have been
used to collate ownership information. That is, if data for a firm are available in the first
source listed in Appendix A, we use that source. If not, we move to the next source, and
so on, until we gather data for each sample firm. If data are not available for year-end
2002, we move to year-end 2001. We are able to find ownership data for all but 23 firms.
As we noted, in the first step of our search algorithm, we identified all
shareholders with ownership of at least 10% of the firm’s voting rights. In firms with
more than one such shareholder, we checked to determine whether two or more of these
blocks were affiliated such that their combined ownership of voting rights exceeded that

10

We exclude financial institutions and utilities, specifically SIC codes 49, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67.
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of the largest single shareholder. If so, these blocks were combined to comprise the
single largest shareholder.11
Using our search procedure and traveling up the ownership tree, we determined
that 1,055 of the firms in our initial sample have an ultimate dominant shareholder who
controls at least 10% of the firm’s voting rights. Of these ultimate owners, 216 are
widely-held firms and, thus, the corresponding sample firms are also considered to be
widely-held. These are removed from the sample such that our sample is narrowed to
839 firms with an ultimate dominant shareholder.
Of course, voting rights are not the same as ownership rights and, as documented
by LLS (1999), CDL (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002), the share of voting rights held
by dominant shareholders often exceeds their proportionate claim on cash flows. CDFL
(2002) report that the value discount in firms with a dominant shareholder is greater the
larger is the difference between proportionate voting and cash flow rights of the dominant
shareholder. Thus, for each of the 839 firms in our sample, we also determine the
fraction of cash flow rights owned by the dominant shareholder by taking the fraction of
cash flow rights held by the dominant shareholder and multiplying that fraction by the
fraction of shares owned in each firm in the ownership tree. Thus, if the ultimate
dominant shareholder is the Smythe family that owns 50% of the shares in Company C
and Company C owns 12% of the shares in Company B who owns 18% of the cash flow
rights and 30% of the voting rights of Company A, we designate the Smythe family as

11

In addition, there are three instances in which we identify at least one dominant shareholder, but for the
purposes of our analyses we deem these firms to be widely held. First, in the case of a tie between the
ultimate voting rights of two different ultimate owners, we consider the firm to be widely held. Second, if,
because of cross-holdings, a firm is its own largest holder, we consider the firm to be widely held. Third,
we consider a firm to be widely held if a financial institution holds a significant percentage of the equity of
the firm as a trustee for its employees’ 401K plan. These three situations occur in six firms.
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controlling 30% of the voting rights of Company A and owning (0.50 x 0.12 x 0.18) x
(100) = 1.08% of the cash flow rights.
II.B

Affiliated directors
Having identified firms with dominant shareholders, we use Bloomberg, Reuters,

EDGAR International, corporate websites, and direct contact with the companies to
identify directors as of year-end 2002. From this effort, we are able to find board data for
all but 40 firms leaving a set of 799. We conduct our empirical analyses with these.
Determination of whether a director is affiliated with the dominant shareholder
involves some subjectivity on our part and will necessarily embed errors. As a guide for
this determination, we draw upon recent corporate governance mandates and/or Codes of
Best Governance Practice from various of the countries in our sample. Such codes urge
that publicly-traded firms have more independent directors and provide some general
guidance as to scenarios under which a director’s independence might be compromised.12
Using the Codes as a guide, we consider a director to be affiliated with the dominant
shareholder when (1) he/she is the dominant shareholder, (2) he/she is an employee of the
firm,13 (3) he/she is a director or employee in any company or subsidiary of any company
that is positioned above the sample firm in the ownership tree (if there is one), (4) he/she
has the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (5) he/she is of the same

12

For example, the Australian Bosch Report on Corporate Practices and Conduct (1995) stipulates that
director independence is more likely to be assured when the director is not a substantial shareholder of the
firm. The Belgian Commission of Corporate Governance (1998) recommendations call for more directors
that do not serve on boards of related firms and who have no family ties to executives. In Greece, the
Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) prescribe more independent directors, defined as unrelated to
the majority owner and having no conflicts of interest. The report prepared by the OECD on Corporate
Governance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets (1998), advises “board
independence usually requires that a sufficient number of board members not be employed by the company
and not be related to the company or its management through significant economic, family or other ties.”
13
We should note that, by far, the vast majority of employee directors are managers. The exception is
Germany wherein boards are required to include labor representatives.
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nationality as the dominant shareholder when the dominant shareholder is a foreigner, or
(6) he/she is a politician or employee of a government agency when the dominant
shareholder is a government. Directors who are not identified as being affiliated with the
dominant shareholder are designated as ‘independent.’
II.C

Legal system
The quality of legal protection afforded to minority shareholders is often viewed

as comprising two elements: (1) statutory provisions (often termed de jure protection) and
(2) the degree to which the statutes are enforced (often called de facto protection).
Following Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005), DKS (2004b), DK (2005), Wurgler (2000),
and others, we use the product of two indices as our primary proxy for the quality of legal
environment. The first is the Anti-director Rights index of LLSV (1998) that ranges from
0 to 6. The second is the Law and Order enforcement index taken from the International
Country Risk Guide and rebalanced to range from 0 to 10.14 We refer to this product as
LEGAL in our regression analysis. The use of this measure has become somewhat
customary in testing hypotheses involving standards of corporate governance.
Nevertheless, we should note that this index is still only a proxy for the difficult-tocapture idea of ‘quality’ of legal shareholder protection.
II.D

Tobin’s Q and other financial data
Our primary dependent variable is the book value of assets minus the book value

of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets (often
referred to as Tobin’s Q). We calculate these ratios as of the end of years 2002, 2003,
and 2004. For 712 firms, data for calculation of Q are from the Edgar International
Database. For the remaining 87 firms, data are from Worldscope.
14

Anti-director and Law and Order index values are for year-end 2003.
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In conducting our primary analysis, we delete firms whose Qs are in the top and
bottom 1% of the distribution. We use this sample of 782 firms with a dominant
shareholder in our initial analysis. Of the dominant shareholders, 347 are individuals or
families, 226 are privately-held operating or holding companies, 101 are privately-held
financial institutions, such as investment funds, and 108 are governments.
Control variables used in the analysis include one-digit SIC codes, annual sales,
sales growth from 2001-2003, intangible assets as a fraction of total assets, ‘need for
funds’ calculated as the difference between historical growth of assets and sustainable
growth of assets (i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)) measured over 2002-200315, and variance of stock
returns calculated with monthly returns over the 24 months 2001-2002. Tobin’s Q is
often thought of as reflecting a firm’s future investment or growth opportunities. The
control variables are meant to control for differences in growth opportunities across
firms. The balance sheet data are for year-end 2003 and are from Worldscope and Edgar
International. The SIC code is the firm’s primary industry from Worldscope. The final
variable is a 1/0 indicator to identify firms whose shares are traded either as a direct
listing on a US stock exchange or as an American Depository Receipt (ADR). This
variable is from the Bank of New York and JP Morgan ADR/Cross-listing databases and
is meant to capture the possibility that cross-listing on a US exchange improves
governance and increases firm value ((BW (2004), DKS (2004b), Siegel (2005), RW
(2002)). The sample contains 232 such firms. We refer to this variable as CROSS-LIST.
II.E

Some descriptive statistics
Table I presents descriptive information for the 782 firms by country of

incorporation. Column 1 gives the number of firms by country. Because of the method
15

As developed by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and also used by Durnev and Kim (2005).
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used to gather data, we have the largest firms (by equity market capitalization) in each
country, but we do not have an equal number of firms from each country. For example,
the US is vastly under-represented. This occurs because, among the 70 largest US firms,
there are only 16 with a dominant shareholder. Similarly, Japan is under-represented
because its largest corporations are owned in a Keiretsu structure whereby the dominant
shareholder is widely-held. The number of firms by country ranges from 10 in Japan to
56 in Italy. Column 2 gives LEGAL, the product of the Anti-director Rights and Law
and Order indices.16 This index ranges from 3.3 in Mexico to 50 in the US and the UK.
As displayed in column 3, the mean percentage of independent directors by
country ranges from 74.6% in the US to 36.5% in Hong Kong. As shown in columns 4
and 5, there is substantial variation in board composition across firms within countries.
For example, the maximum and minimum percentages of independent directors are
45.5% and 93.3% in the US, while they are 0.0% and 100% in France and Germany.
Columns 6 – 8 show that there is considerable variation in board size both across and
within countries.
The table also gives the mean percentage voting rights (column 9) and cash flow
rights (column 10) of the dominant shareholder. In each country, the mean percentage
voting rights of the dominant shareholder exceeds his mean percentage cash flow rights
with a spread between the two of 0.6% in Mexico up to a spread of 18.6% in Italy.
The final set of data in table I are the mean, minimum and maximum Tobin’s Q
for firms in each country. Across countries, the mean Q ranges from 1.03 in Brazil to
2.07 in Australia. As with board composition and board size, Qs show considerable

16

The individual components of the indices are available from the authors.
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within country variation. For example, Qs range from 1.03 to 5.29 in Australia and from
0.74 to 6.67 in India.
We now investigate whether the variation in Q ratios across firms is
systematically related to board composition.
III.

Univariate Statistical Analysis
Table II presents the results of preliminary statistical analysis. Panel A gives

mean and median Qs according to the level of legal shareholder protection, LEGAL.
Countries are classified into three groups according to LEGAL with the eight countries
having LEGAL ≥ 30 in group 1, the five countries with 30 > LEGAL ≥ 20 in group 2 and
the nine countries with LEGAL < 20 in group 3. Qs vary systematically across levels of
shareholder legal protection with higher protection associated with higher Qs: the mean Q
of 1.58 for group 1 is significantly greater than the mean Q of 1.38 in group 3 (p-value =
0.01). The test of medians supports the test of means (p-value < 0.01). Stronger countrylevel legal shareholder protection is associated with higher firm values.
Panel B of table II, gives mean and median Qs when the sample of firms is split
into three groups according to the percentage of independent directors. Firms with more
than 66.7% independent directors comprise group 1, firms with 33.3% to 66.7%
independent directors comprise group 2, and firms with less than 33.3% independent
directors comprise group 3. Mean and median Qs increase monotonically with the
increase in the fraction of independent directors and the differences in means and
medians between groups 1 and 3 are statistically significant (p-values < 0.01). ‘Stronger’
boards are associated with higher market values.
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Panel C of table II gives mean and median Qs for three groups of firms according
to board size: those with boards having 7 or fewer directors (small boards), those with 8
to 11 directors, and those having 12 or more directors (big boards). The three groups
contain approximately equal numbers of firms. Mean and median Qs tend to decline as
board size increases, but the decline in medians is not monotonic across the three groups.
Thus, larger boards tend to be associated with lower market values, but the relationship is
not pervasive.
LLSV (2002) report that, in firms with a dominant shareholder, Q is positively
related to the percentage of cash flow rights owned by the dominant shareholder. They
interpret this to mean that higher cash flow ownership increases the incentive of the
dominant shareholder to increase corporate value. In panel D of table II, firms are sorted
into three groups according to the percentage cash flow rights of the dominant
shareholder. In group 1, the dominant shareholder has cash flow rights > 45.6%, in group
2, 45.6% ≥ cash flow rights ≥ 20.6%, and in group 3, cash flow rights < 20.6%. The
three groups have roughly equal numbers of firms. On a univariate basis, neither mean
nor median Qs increase as cash flow rights of the dominant shareholder increase and the
differences in mean and median Qs between the high cash flow and low cash flow
ownership groups is not statistically significant. On a univariate basis, higher cash flow
rights on the part of the dominant shareholder are not associated with high firm values (at
least not in our sample of firms with a dominant shareholder).
IV.

Multivariate Statistical Analysis

IV.A

Base case regressions
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The result of primary interest from our univariate analysis is that, in firms with a
dominant shareholder, firm value varies positively with the fraction of directors who are
‘independent’ of the dominant shareholder. We now examine that relationship with a
multivariate regression analysis.

Consistent with CDFL (2002), DK (2005), LLSV

(2002) and others, we use a country random effects specification. Henceforth, we use
INDDIR% to represent the percentage of the board made up of independent directors.
Column 1 of table III presents the results of what can be thought of as our ‘base
case’ regression. The dependent variable is the Q ratio where Q is calculated as the
average of the year-end 2002 and 2003 market-to-book value ratios for each firm. The
independent variables include LEGAL, the CROSS-LIST indicator set to one if the firm
has a US-traded stock or ADR as of year-end 2002, the dominant shareholder’s
percentage cash flow rights, an interaction term of percentage cash flow rights multiplied
by LEGAL, ln (sales) for the fiscal year 2003, the ratio of intangible assets to total assets,
the geometric average sales growth rate over the interval 2001-2003, ‘need for external
financing’ as defined above, and the variance of stock returns. The regression also
includes the one-digit industry SIC code for each firm. Unless indicated otherwise, we
include each of these independent variables in our subsequent regressions.
The regression in column 1 does not include our key independent variable, the
percentage of the board made up of independent directors, nor does it include ln (board
size). Rather, this regression asks whether the results of prior studies are robust in our
data.
Consistent with LLSV (2002), DK (2005) and others, the coefficient of LEGAL is
positive and significant (p-value = 0.04).

Also consistent with LLSV (2002), the
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coefficient of dominant shareholder’s cash flow rights is positive and (arguably)
significant with a p-value of 0.09, while the coefficient of the interaction of cash flow
rights and LEGAL is negative and also (arguably) significant (p-value = 0.09). In
subsequent regressions, these results are essentially unchanged except that in some
specifications, the p-value of LEGAL creeps upward and reaches 0.11 in one
specification.

Thus, in firms with a dominant shareholder, firm value is positively

correlated with the country-level of legal shareholder protection and with the fraction of
cash flow rights held by the dominant shareholder and negatively correlated with the
interaction of these terms. The implication is that firm value is higher in countries with
stronger shareholder legal protection and is higher when the dominant shareholder has a
larger cash flow ownership position. However, the combination of these two factors is
not additive.
The coefficient of the CROSS-LIST indicator is positive, but the p-value is only
0.16. In later specifications, the p-values for this variable range from 0.09 to 0.56. This
result differs from DKS (2004b), but their sample includes nearly 5,000 observations.
The coefficient of CROSS-LIST in our regression is a bit smaller than in theirs, but the
major difference is the size of the standard errors. We cannot conclude that cross listing
on a US exchange does not increase firm value.
Of the control variables, the only one that is statistically significant is ln (sales)
(p-value < 0.01). Consistent with DK (2005), the coefficient is negative indicating that Q
decreases as firm ‘size’ increases.
specifications.

This result is also robust to each of our later
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The regression in column 2 of table III is a minor variation on the regression in
column 1 such that column 2 can also be thought of as a base case regression. The only
difference in column 2 is that the dependent variable Q is the average of the 2003-2004
firm market-to-book values.

We use this lead/lag specification because we will

subsequently be concerned with the possible endogeneity of Q and INDDIR%. One
simple way to address this concern is to lag Q relative to the point in time at which the
composition of the board is determined.
Suffice it to say that the results in column 2 are essentially the same as those in
column 1 except that the p-value of LEGAL increases from 0.04 to 0.08.
IV.B

Percentage independent directors
We now estimate regressions with our two board variables - - INDDIR% and

board size - - included as independent variables.

In columns 3 – 5, we estimate

regressions with various specifications of INDDIR% along with ln (board size).
Column 3 is a linear specification of INDDIR%. The coefficient of INDDIR% is
positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.02), while the coefficient of ln (board
size) is negative and significant (p-value = 0.05). The regression in column 4 uses a
quadratic specification of INDDIR%. The linear term continues to be significant (pvalue = 0.03), while the coefficient of the squared term is negative and ‘borders’ upon
statistical significance (p-value = 0.12). Additionally, the adjusted r2 is mildly higher
with the quadratic specification suggesting a positive, but non-linear relationship between
Q and the percentage of independent directors.

The coefficient of ln (board size)

continues to be negative and significant (p-value = 0.04).
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The regression in column 5 uses the specification of ln (INDDIR%). Because
there are 12 firms with zero independent directors and ln (0) is undefined, we drop these
12 observations from the sample. The coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) is positive and
statistically significant (p-value = 0.02) as is the coefficient of ln (board size). Further
the adjusted r2 increases relative to the linear and quadratic specifications. For that
reason, we use the log specification in our subsequent analyses. (As an aside, we also
replicated every regression that we estimate later with the linear and quadratic
specifications and the results are essentially unchanged.) The implication of columns 4
and 5 is that firm value increases at a decreasing rate as the percentage of independent
directors increases (in firms with a dominant shareholder).
For their measure of country-level legal protection, LLSV (2002) use two
different specifications. The first is their Anti-director Rights index; the second is the
origin of the country’s legal system (either common law or civil code). In regression 6,
we replace LEGAL with the LLSV (2002) Anti-director Rights index updated to 2003
and we replace the interaction of cash flow rights with LEGAL by the interaction of cash
flow rights with the Anti-director Rights index. Consistent with LLSV (2002), the
coefficient of the Anti-director Rights index is positive with a p-value of 0.09 and the
coefficient of interaction term is negative (but, unlike LLSV (2002), with a p-value of
0.05, the coefficient is statistically significant). In column 7, we replace LEGAL with an
indicator equal to one in countries that have a common law origin and zero for all other
countries and we interact the dominant shareholder’s percentage cash flow rights with the
indicator. Contrary to LLSV (2002), the coefficient of legal origin is not significant (pvalue = 0.44). In both regressions 6 and 7, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) continues to

27

be positive and statistically significant (p-values = 0.02) and the coefficient of ln (board
size) continues to be negative and statistically significant (p-values = 0.02).
As we noted, one concern with our analysis is that board composition and Q are
endogenously determined. One simple approach to addressing endogeneity is to lag the
dependent variable relative to the determination of key independent variable. In the final
regression of table III, we use lagged Q calculated as the average of year-end 2003-2004
market-to-book ratios and board composition as of year-end 2002 along with LEGAL and
our other variables from regression 1. In this specification, the p-value for LEGAL slips
to 0.11. The p-value of ln (INDDIR%) is 0.05. The coefficient of ln (board size) is
negative but the p-value is 0.20.
The answer to the first question that we posed at the outset is affirmative: in firms
with a dominant shareholder, the documented value discount can be offset, at least in
part, by a dominant shareholder appointing an ‘independent’ board. This offset can even
be achieved for firms with shares or ADRs traded on a US exchange. That is, a dominant
shareholder can add further value to his firm by appointing a strong board even if the
firm’s shares are traded on a US exchange.
IV.C

Percentage independent directors when legal protection is weak
The second question that we posed is whether board composition has a

differential effect in countries with strong vs. weak levels of legal protection for
shareholders. It can be argued that a strong board is likely to be more valuable in a
country with weak legal shareholder protection because the potential for value added
therein is greater given that shareholders are already protected in countries with strong
legal environments. Contrarily, it can be argued that a ‘strong’ board would have little
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effect in a country with weak legal protection because the board is fundamentally at the
mercy of the dominant shareholder in the absence of a protective legal environment.
Under this argument, a ‘strong’ board might be more valuable in a country with a
stronger legal environment where the board might have greater leverage through the legal
system. The regressions presented in table IV address these arguments.
In particular, we estimate regression 5 of table III for countries with different
levels of LEGAL. In parallel with the groupings in the univariate analysis of table II, we
estimate the regression separately for the eight countries with LEGAL ≥ 30 (i.e., high
shareholder protection countries) and the nine countries with LEGAL < 20 (i.e., low
protection countries). The results are given in columns 1 and 2 of table IV.
As shown in column 1, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) is positive and
statistically significant in the low protection sample (p-value < 0.01). As shown in
column 2, the coefficient is close to zero with a p-value of 0.71 in the high protection
sample.

Further, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) in the low protection group is

significantly greater than the coefficient in the high protection group (p-value < 0.01).
The median value of LEGAL is 20. As a further test, we estimate the regression
with firms from the 12 countries with LEGAL ≤ 20 and with firms from the 10 countries
with LEGAL > 20. The results of these regressions are given in columns 3 and 4. The
coefficients of ln (INDDIR%) and their p-values in these two columns are essentially the
same as those of columns 1 and 2.
Thus, the tests in table IV indicate that a ‘strong’ board is more important in
offsetting the value discount associated with a dominant shareholder in a country with
weak legal protection for shareholders. This suggests that a dominant shareholder who is
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so inclined could offset, at least in part, the value reduction associated with weak legal
shareholder protection by appointing a strong board and this effect appears to be more
consequential in countries with weaker legal protection for shareholders.
V.

Tests of Robustness
In this section, we take up the question of whether the results of tables III and IV

are robust. We begin by estimating a two-stage instrumental variables regression (2SIV)
model to address the ever-present concern that the results are due to endogeneity. We
then consider other specifications of the regressions in tables III and IV.
V.A

Endogeneity addressed with instrumental variables regressions
We estimate a linear system of two equations with Tobin’s Q and INDDIR% as

the endogenously determined variables. The estimation technique we use is two-stage
least squares instrumental variable regression (2SIV) which requires that we find suitable
instruments for the endogenous variables. A suitable instrument is one that is correlated
with the endogenous variable but not with the error terms in the regression equation in
which this variable is used as a regressor.
In line with Campa and Kedia (2002), DK (2005), HW (1991) and others, we use
prior year’s variables as instruments for Tobin’s Q. Specifically, we use prior year’s Q
and the logarithm of prior year’s sales. DK (2005) and Lins (2003) argue that industry
indicators are also suitable instruments because they affect Q, but do not affect corporate
governance. We, therefore, also use one-digit SIC indicators as instruments for Q.
In line with Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), DK (2005), and Lins (2003), we use
the alpha and beta of the firm’s stock returns as instruments for INDDIR%. When
available, we use the alpha and beta from Worldscope as of 2002. When the data are not
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available in Worldscope, we estimate the firm’s alpha and beta using OLS regressions
and the 24 monthly returns over 2001-2002 from Datastream.
In the first stage of the 2SIV procedure we regress INDIRR% and Tobin’s Q on
all exogenous and predetermined variables in the system. We then use the predicted
values from the first stage as regressors in the second stage. We estimate two systems of
equations. One of them employs the firm’s average Qs for 2002-2003 and the other the
average Qs for 2003-2004. The independent variables are the same as those in regression
5 in table III except that we also include country indicators and we exclude industry
indicators from the board composition regressions. Results from the second stage of the
estimation are reported in table IV.
As shown in the first regression of panel A, the coefficient of LEGAL is positive
and significant as a predictor of ln (INDDIR%) (p-value = 0.06). That is, firms in weak
legal environments have fewer independent directors. The coefficient of ln (board size)
is positive and significant: larger boards have a higher percentage of independent
directors.
In the second regression of panel A, in which the dependent variable is the
predicted Tobin’s Q for 2002-2003, ln (INDDIR%) is positive and significant (p-value =
0.03). The coefficient of board size continues to be negative, but its p-value slips (pvalue = 0.11) and LEGAL loses statistical significance (p-value = 0.13).
The third and fourth regressions of table V are the same as the first two except
that Q is the lagged average of 2003 and 2004 firm market-to-book ratios. The results of
regressions three and four are quite similar to those of regressions one and two. In sum,
based on the 2SIV analysis, firm value depends upon board composition and possibly
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board size and legal environment, but board composition does not appear to depend upon
firm value. That is, causality appears to run in one direction only.
Panel B of table V shows the results when the system is estimated separately for
firms in countries with weak legal shareholder protection (LEGAL < 20) and for those in
countries with strong shareholder protection (LEGAL ≥ 30). In these regressions, we are
asking whether the coefficient of board composition (i.e., INDDIR%) is larger and more
significant in countries with weaker shareholder protection after controlling for possible
endogeneity.
The results here are similar to those of table IV. As in table IV, in countries with
weak legal protection for shareholders, the coefficient of ln (INDDIR%) is positive and
statistically significant (p-value = 0.04). In countries with strong shareholder protection,
the coefficient of INDDIR% is also positive, but much smaller and not statistically
different from zero (p-value = 0.15). Additionally, the coefficients of INDDIR% from
the two regressions are significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.01).
In short, the results in table V provide some assurance that the relationships in
tables III and IV are not the result of reverse causality or spurious endogeneity.
V.B

Fixed country effects
The random country effects specifications in tables III and IV are supported by

the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test and the Hausman specification
test. Nonetheless, we recognize that the countries in our sample may not be ‘truly’
representative of the population. As an alternative, we estimate the regressions in tables
III and IV with country fixed effects. In the six regressions that correspond to the last six
in table III, the p-values of the coefficients of INDDIR% range from 0.02 to 0.06. In the
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four regressions that correspond to those in table IV, the coefficients of INDDIR% are
statistically significant in the set with low LEGAL scores (all p-values < 0.10), but are
not close to significant in those with high LEGAL scores (p-values > 0.31). In short, the
results with country fixed effects regressions are nearly identical to those with country
random effects.
V.C

Full sample including Q outliers
Our regressions to this point have used a trimmed sample in which we dropped

the 17 firms with Qs in the top and bottom 1% of the distribution so as to ensure that our
results would not be due to outliers in our independent variable. We also estimate each
of the regressions in tables III and IV using the full set of 799 firms for which we have
data. In five of the six regressions that correspond to those in table III, the p-value of
INDDIR% is less than 0.05. In the sixth, the lagged regression, the p-value is 0.10. In
the regressions that correspond to those of table IV, for the two that encompass countries
with low LEGAL scores, the coefficients of INDDIR% are positive and statistically
significant (p-value < 0.01). For those that include countries with high LEGAL scores,
the coefficients do not approach statistical significance (p-values > 0.55). Thus, our
results are not due to the use of a trimmed sample.
V.D

Criterion for dominant shareholders
As our criterion for a dominant shareholder, we require that a shareholder control

more than 10% of the firm’s votes. An argument can be made that 10% is too few shares
to own for a shareholder to be able to unilaterally appoint the firm’s board of directors.
To consider what effect altering this criterion has on the results, we replicate the
regressions of tables III and IV including only firms in which the dominant shareholder
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controls at least 15% of the votes and then using a 20% cutoff. The 15% cut-off reduces
the sample by 103 firms, while the 20% cutoff reduces it by an additional 61 firms. In
the regressions that correspond to those in table III, with both the 15% and the 20%
cutoff, the coefficients of INDDIR% are all positive and each of the p-values is slightly
smaller than its counterpart in table III.
In the regressions that correspond to those of table IV, with both the 15% and the
20% cutoff, for those regressions that include countries with low LEGAL scores, the
coefficients of INDDIR% are positive and statistically significant (p-values < 0.01). For
those that include countries with high LEGAL scores, the coefficients do not approach
statistical significance (p-values > 0.57).
Of course, as we continue to raise the threshold as to what constitutes a dominant
shareholder, the sample continues to shrink and, not surprisingly, the coefficients of
INDDIR% become less significant. Thus, this analysis involves a trade-off between
determination of a dominant shareholder and sample size. At the customary cut-offs for
determination of a dominant shareholder, our initial results are robust.
V.E

Wedge
As have LLSV (2002), we use cash flow rights to capture any incentive effect of

share ownership in firm value. Using a variation on this theme, Baek, Kang, and Park
(2004) and CDFL (2002) find that Q varies inversely with the difference between the
voting rights and cash flow rights owned by the firm’s largest shareholder. CDL (2000)
refer to this difference as the “wedge” between control and cash flow rights. We borrow
this term and calculate the wedge between the percentage voting rights and the
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percentage cash flow rights of the dominant shareholder as the percentage voting rights
less the percentage cash flow rights.
We experimented with numerous specifications using wedge in place of cash flow
ownership. In none of the regressions is wedge significant. Thus, in firms in which there
is a shareholder with dominant or controlling voting rights, greater cash flow ownership
by the dominant shareholder is associated with higher valuation, but the magnitude of the
spread between the dominant shareholder’s voting rights and cash flow ownership does
not seem to influence valuation in our sample. Our results could be due to the fact that
we only include firms with a dominant shareholder, whereas, other studies that explore
wedge include a broader set of firms. Importantly, though, in each of the regression
specifications with wedge, the coefficient of the INDDIR% has the same signs and levels
of significance as in tables III and IV.
V.F

Government controlled firms
Unlike some prior studies that examine the role of dominant shareholders, we

exclude firms whose dominant shareholder is a widely-held firm. Our reasoning is that
the theoretical models regarding the effect of a dominant shareholder are built on the
presumption that a dominant shareholder diverts firm resources for personal
consumption. It is difficult to envision what it means for a widely-held firm to have
personal consumption. But we do include firms in which the government is the dominant
shareholder on the presumption that government implies a bureaucrat who may well be
able to divert resources. Still, it could be argued that governments no more consume than
do widely-held corporations.
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Thus, we exclude firms whose dominant shareholder is a government. This
reduces the sample to 674 observations. With this set of firms, we re-estimate each of the
regressions of tables III and IV. In the regressions that correspond to the last six in table
III, the coefficients of INDDIR% are all positive with p-values that range from 0.04 to
0.09. In the four regressions that correspond to those in table IV, the coefficients of
INDDIR% are positive and statistically significant in the set with low LEGAL scores (pvalues < 0.05), but are not close to significant in those with high LEGAL scores (p-values
> 0.61).
V.G

Industry-adjusted Qs
The regressions in tables III and IV include one-digit industry indicators to

control for any systematic industry effects in board composition. As an alternative, we
omitted industry indicators and replicated the regressions using industry-adjusted Qs and
industry-adjusted sales growth along with the other variables in the tables. To compute
industry-adjusted Q, for each firm, we subtract the average of the firm’s home country
one-digit industry Q for 2002-2003 from the firm’s 2002-2003 average Q. Industryadjusted sales growth is the difference between the geometric growth in sales over 20012003 for a sample firm and its one-digit home country industry average geometric sales
growth over the same interval.
For the regressions that correspond to those in table III, each of the coefficients of
INDDIR% is positive with a p-value ≤ 0.07. In the four regressions that correspond to
those of table IV, for the two that encompass countries with low LEGAL scores, the
coefficients of INDDIR% are positive and statistically significant (p-values < 0.01). For

36

those that include countries with high LEGAL scores, the coefficients do not approach
statistical significance (p-values > 0.34).
V.H

A comparison with CLSA scores
DK (2005) and KL (2004) use CLSA scores in conducting their primary analyses

of the effect of firm-specific governance on firm value. As we noted, board factors
comprise a component of these scores. It could be argued that there is some other
objective or subjective firm-specific aspect of the ‘quality’ of governance that explains
the connection between firm value and CLSA scores and that other factor just happens to
be correlated with board composition.

Thus, what we are observing is a spurious

correlation between INDDIR% and firm value.
Desirably, we would conduct a competition between CLSA scores and INDDIR%
to determine which has the most explanatory power for Q. Unfortunately, the CLSA
scores are available only for emerging markets (primarily Southeast Asia) and we are
able to find board composition for only five of the CLSA countries. In terms of firms,
only 67 in our sample have CLSA scores (13, 15, 16, 5 and 18 from Brazil, Hong Kong ,
India, Korea and Malaysia, respectively).

The lack of overlap in the two samples

precludes an extensive head-to-head competition.

Additionally, Credit Lyonais has

discontinued this service, thus, the latest available CLSA scores are as of 2001.
Nevertheless, as a partial test, we estimated regression 5 of table III using only the
67 firms in our sample for which CLSA scores are available. The coefficient of ln
(INDDIR%) is positive with a p-value of 0.09. We then estimated the regression using
the COMPOSITE CLSA score from DK in lieu of ln (INDDIR%). The coefficient of
COMPOSITE is positive, but the p-value is only 0.24. Based on this limited analysis,
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board composition overlaps with but captures some element of governance that is not
encompassed by the CLSA scores. Given that CLSA has discontinued this service, board
composition may convey whatever information is contained in the CLSA score and, thus,
be a robust surrogate.17
V.I

In sum
As in every empirical investigation, conducting our analyses involves a multitude

of decisions about sample selection, empirical methodologies, variable selection, and
variable specification. Any or each of these can influence the results of a study. We
have examined the sensitivity of our results to alternative decisions regarding each of
these factors.

As best we can determine, the primary conclusions drawn from our

analyses are not due to the choices made.
VI.

Commentary and Conclusion
A by-product of our analysis is the finding that, after controlling for country-level

legal protection, board composition, and other factors, the size of the board is negatively
correlated with firm value, although the relationship is not always statistically significant.
This result is generally consistent with the findings in studies by Eisenberg, Sundgren,
and Wells (1998), Kusnadi and Mak (2005), and Yermack (1996) that larger boards are
associated with lower firm values in Finland, Southeast Asia, and the U.S., respectively
Given that our results suggest that dominant shareholders in weaker legal
regimes can, at least in part, offset the loss in value due to weak legal shareholder
protection by establishing a strong board, the question arises as to whether a strong board
can fully make up for the lack of strong legal protection. To address that question, we

17

We have been told by Credit Lyonnais that this service was discontinued, at least in part, because of the
unhappiness of some clients with their scores.
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conduct numerical analyses with the coefficients of our cross-sectional regressions. As
might be expected, the degree to which a strong board can offset the loss in value due to
weak country-level legal shareholder protection depends on the initial level of investor
protection and the level to which the dominant shareholder aspires. At the extremes, the
numerical analysis indicates that a strong board cannot make up the difference in value
associated with weaker legal shareholder protection. For example, with all else equal, the
increase in Q in moving from a country with a legal protection index of 3.3 (such as
Mexico at the bottom of the range) to a country with a legal protection index of 50.0
(such as the UK at the top of the range) is greater than the increase in value in moving
from a board with 10% independent directors to a board with 90% independent directors
in the same country.
For narrower differences in legal shareholder protection, a strong board can more
than compensate for weaker country-level shareholder protection. For example, the gain
in value in moving from a country with a legal protection index of 20 to an index of 40 is
less than the gain in value by moving from a board with 10% independent directors to a
board with 90% independent directors in the country with a legal index of 20. Thus, the
data indicate that a dominant shareholder could ameliorate the loss in value associated
with a firm having a dominant shareholder and, if the firm’s home-country level of legal
protection is not too weak, the dominant shareholder can offset the loss fully if he is so
inclined.

Our analysis of 799 firms with dominant shareholders from 22 countries finds a
positive and statistically significant relationship between firm value and the percentage of
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the board made up of directors not affiliated with the dominant shareholder.

This

relationship is especially pronounced in countries with weak legal protection for
shareholders. The implication is that, a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could
raise the value of his firm by appointing an ‘independent’ board and this would be
especially so in countries that provide weaker legal protection for shareholders.
Should the dominant shareholder decide to appoint a strong board, a question that
arises is whether a sufficiently independent board could recover the full value discount
associated with the firm operating in a weak legal environment. To address that question,
we conduct numerical analyses with the coefficients estimated in column 5 of table III
(the key variables are LEGAL and ln (INDDIR%)). To conduct the numerical analyses,
we use the mean values of the independent variables and set the industry indicator to one
for the manufacturing sector. We then vary LEGAL from 3.3 (which represents Mexico
at the bottom end of the range) to 50 (which represents the US, the UK and Canada at the
top end of the range). We vary INDDIR% from 10% to 90%. With these parameter
values, we calculate implied Qs.
As a starting point, of course, given any board composition, firms with a
dominant shareholder in countries with higher LEGAL scores have higher Qs than those
in countries with lower LEGAL scores and, given any LEGAL score, firms with more
directors who are not affiliated with the dominant shareholder have higher Qs than those
with few directors unaffiliated with the dominant shareholder. The more interesting
comparisons involve firms across LEGAL scores and with different board compositions.
For example, the dominant shareholder in a country such as Mexico, with a LEGAL
index of 3.3, could increase Q from 1.41 to 1.69 by increasing the percentage of
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unaffiliated directors from 10% to 90%. In comparison, a dominant shareholder of a
similar firm in a country such as the UK, with a LEGAL index of 50, could achieve a Q
of 2.01 with a board composed of 90% affiliated directors. That is, even if he were so
inclined, a dominant shareholder could not make up the full loss in value associated with
very weak country-level shareholder legal protection by appointing a ‘strong’ board.
In contrast, a dominant shareholder in a country with moderate legal protection
could compensate by appointing a strong board. For example, a dominant shareholder in
a country such as India, with a LEGAL index of 20, could raise his firm’s Q from 1.63 to
1.92 by increasing the percentage of independent directors from 10% to 90%. The
increase in Q associated with this board restructuring is equivalent to raising legal
protection from a score of 20 to 40 (the score in Australia). That is, in a country such as
India, if he was so inclined, a dominant shareholder could achieve the Q of a firm in
Australia by appointing an independent board (assuming that the Australian board has
10% independent directors).
Of course, the increase in value is not without cost to the dominant shareholder.
In particular, the theoretical models that analyze the economics of firms controlled by a
dominant shareholder predict a value discount in such firms and attribute the discount to
diversion of corporate resources for personal use by the dominant shareholder. The cost
to the dominant shareholder of a strong board is the loss of these perquisites of control.
For the dominant shareholder, the question becomes one of trading off the personal value
of these lost perquisites against the value increase in his shares. The value increase will
only be valuable to the dominant shareholder if he expects to sell shares either from
personal account or through the firm to raise capital for value increasing projects.
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Otherwise, there would appear to be little incentive for the shareholder to unilaterally
appoint a ‘stronger’ board.
In this framework, dominant shareholders are more likely to choose independent
directors when their firms have profitable investment opportunities and a shortage of
internal capital to fund them. All of this raises the question of what factors determine
board composition. We have only explored that question peripherally here in the 2SIV
analysis. However, there we find that the “need for funds” is negatively correlated with
the fraction of independent directors. Thus, on a preliminary basis, this obvious factor
does not seem to play a role in determining board composition across countries.
There have been studies of the determinants of board composition in the US,
although they do not focus on firms with dominant shareholders. These include Boone,
Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2005), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2005), Lehn, Patro and
Zhao (2005), and Linck, Netter and Yang (2005). Investigation of the determinants
across countries with different levels of legal shareholder protection would be a useful
next step in understanding the role of directors in firms with dominant shareholders.
Throughout we have emphasized that we are interested in the effect of board
composition in firms with dominant shareholders. Our motivation is the observation that
most publicly-traded firms outside the US are controlled by a dominant shareholder. But
there are also firms outside the US that are widely-held. The definition of an independent
director in such firms would be quite different from the definition used here.

We

consider directors to be affiliated if they share the same last name and have other direct
ties to the dominant shareholder. In widely-held firms where there is no dominant
shareholder with whom ties can be established, the primary agency conflict is often
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thought of as being the conflict between management and shareholders rather than the
conflict between a dominant shareholder and other investors. Whether a ‘strong’ board
has a similar role in such firms is a further question to be explored.
A number of studies have examined the connection between board composition
and firm value in US firms. These include AK (1996, 2001), BB (2002), and HW (1991,
2003). The consensus view from these studies is that there is no connection between
board composition and firm value in the US. This conclusion is not inconsistent with
ours. First, these studies do not focus on firms with a dominant shareholder. Second, the
definition of an independent director in these studies differs from ours. Third, even in
firms with a dominant shareholder, we find that the connection between board
composition and value derives primarily from countries with low country-level legal
protection, whereas, in countries with high legal protection, such as the US, board
composition appears to have much less relation to firm value.
In conclusion, then, numerous questions about cross-country determinants of
board composition remain unanswered. The key result of our study is that firm value is
positively correlated with the fraction of directors unaffiliated with dominant
shareholders especially in countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders.
The implication is that, were he so inclined, a dominant shareholder could increase the
value of his firm by appointing a ‘strong’ board, especially in countries with weak legal
shareholder protection.
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Table I
Descriptive statistics on firms with a dominant shareholder
This table gives statistics by country for a sample of 782 publicly traded firms with a dominant shareholder from 22 countries. A firm has a dominant shareholder if
an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the voting rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index
measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and the Law and Order index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. Percentage
independent directors is calculated as the number of independent directors divided by board size. A director is considered independent if that board member is not an
employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not
have the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and (e) is
not a member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government. Board size is the number of directors on the firm’s board. Tobin’s Q is the average
2002-2003 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. Percentage
cash flow and voting rights of the dominant shareholder are computed as per Appendix A.

Country

Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
India
Italy
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
UK
US

(1)

(2)

Firms

LEGAL

21
52
49
36
51
39
39
30
52
55
45
56
10
20
55
25
27
22
26
37
19
16

40
15
7.5
50
20
40
22.5
16.7
10
15
20
10
25
16.7
15
3.3
20
33.3
30
30
50
50

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Min
33.0
0.00
0.00
13.3
11.1
20.0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
25.0
0.00
22.2
14.3
14.3
0.00
45.5

Max
90.0
90.0
100
100
85.7
100
100
100
90.9
72.2
80.0
91.7
71.4
70.0
77.8
80.0
80.0
71.4
100
83.3
93.3
93.3

(8)

Board size

Percentage independent
directors
Mean
64.5
48.7
57.6
66.7
43.4
66.3
56.9
56.6
51.8
36.5
45.3
57.1
38.0
45.9
47.3
54.0
48.2
42.4
55.9
46.6
57.7
74.6

(7)

Mean
8.5
8.8
8.4
11.8
7.9
6.6
11.6
14.8
8.2
10.2
11.0
10.8
14.0
8.9
8.4
11.9
10.1
9.7
11.8
10.3
11.9
12.0

Min
3
2
3
6
3
3
3
3
3
5
3
5
7
5
5
4
4
5
6
5
7
8

Max
14
20
16
17
13
11
21
22
16
24
19
20
30
17
15
18
24
17
18
16
16
15

(9)
Mean
percentage
voting rights of
dominant
shareholder
35.3
46.6
54.0
46.2
33.1
37.7
44.6
49.8
48.1
43.6
50.5
53.5
40.1
36.6
42.5
55.7
30.4
37.3
38.5
29.7
20.6
21.0

(10)
Mean
percentage CF
rights of
dominant
shareholder
26.4
29.9
49.7
33.7
31.2
29.9
32.5
37.4
42.7
39.3
46.8
34.9
26.0
23.3
39.1
55.1
27.9
35.2
30.7
28.1
16.9
17.3

(11)

(12)

(13)

Tobin’s Q
Mean
2.07
1.47
1.03
1.90
1.34
1.47
1.70
1.66
1.88
1.07
1.89
1.54
1.96
0.95
1.39
1.15
1.50
1.32
1.54
1.36
1.39
1.07

Min
1.03
0.71
0.40
1.07
0.76
0.77
0.91
0.89
0.59
0.45
0.74
0.74
1.00
0.62
0.52
0.77
0.62
0.71
0.79
0.59
0.78
0.60

Max
5.29
3.31
2.91
6.21
6.38
4.04
6.67
4.12
5.06
4.11
6.67
4.30
6.44
1.32
3.72
2.16
3.48
2.44
5.68
5.12
2.64
1.57
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Table II
Tobin’s Q across legal and firm-specific characteristics
This table reports the mean and median Tobin’s Qs for 782 firms with a dominant shareholder from 22 countries listed in
table I classified according to the country’s level of investor protection and other characteristics. A firm has a dominant
shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the voting rights in the
firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index as of 2003, where Anti-director
Rights index is an index measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law and Order index is an index
measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. Percentage independent directors is calculated as the number
of independent directors divided by board size. A director is considered independent if that board member is not an
employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board member in any other company or its
subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the
same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and (e) is not a member of government
when the dominant shareholder is a government. Board size is the number of directors on the firm’s board. Tobin’s Q is the
average 2002-2003 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of
assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. Percentage cash flow rights are computed as per Appendix A. P-values for one-sided
tests are in parentheses.
Panel A: Tobin’s Q classified by investor rights index LEGAL
(1)
Sample
Tobin’s Q
Size
Mean

(2)
Median

LEGAL ≥ 30

216
(8 countries)

1.58

1.27

20 ≤ LEGAL < 30

172
(5 countries)

1.58

1.21

LEGAL < 20

394
(9 countries)

1.38

1.10

0.20
(0.01)

0.17
(0.00)

Difference in mean Qs
between LEGAL ≥ 30 and
LEGAL < 20

Panel B: Tobin’s Q classified by percentage independent directors
(1)
Sample
Tobin’s Q
Size
Mean

(2)
Median

Percentage independent
directors ≥ 66.7

233

1.57

1.23

33.3 < Percentage
independent directors <
66.7

387

1.49

1.13

Percentage independent
directors ≤ 33.3

162

1.32

1.12

0.25
(0.00)

0.11
(0.00)

Difference in mean Qs
between top and bottom
group
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Panel C: Tobin’s Q classified by board size
(1)
Sample
Tobin’s Q
Size
Mean

(2)
Median

Board size ≤ 7

227

1.56

1.17

7 < Board size < 12

322

1.55

1.20

Board size ≥ 12

233

1.30

1.10

0.26
(0.00)

0.07
(0.11)

Difference in mean Qs
between top and bottom
group

Panel D: Tobin’s Q classified by cash flow rights of dominant shareholder
(1)
(2)
Sample
Tobin’s Q
Size
Mean
Median
Percentage cash flow rights
of dominant shareholder >
45.6

258

1.45

1.13

20.6 ≤ Percentage cash flow
rights of dominant
shareholder ≤ 45.6

264

1.47

1.16

Percentage cash flow rights
of dominant shareholder <
20.6

260

1.52

1.21

-0.07
(0.36)

-0.08
(0.22)

Difference in mean Qs
between top and bottom
group
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Table III
Regressions of Tobin’s Q on LEGAL, INDDIR%, board size, and control variables
This table reports the coefficients and p-values for random country effects regressions using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable for 782 industrial firms with a
dominant shareholder from 22 countries. A firm has a dominant shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the
voting rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index as of 2003, where Anti-director Rights index is an index
measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law and Order index is an index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. Percentage
independent directors is calculated as the number of independent directors divided by board size. A director is considered independent if that board member is not an
employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have
the same family name as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and (e) is not a
member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government. Board size is the number of directors on the firm’s board. Tobin’s Q is the average 2002-2003
or 2003-2004 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. Percentage
cash flow rights are computed as per Appendix A. The natural log of sales and the ratio of intangible-to-total assets are as of year-end 2003. Sales growth and need for
external financing, calculated as the difference between historical growth of assets and sustainable growth of assets (i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)), are measured over 2002-2003.
The variance of stock returns is calculated with monthly returns over the 24 months 2001-2002. Coefficients are in the columns. P-values are in parentheses.
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Coefficients of country random effects regression models
Dependent variable = Tobin’s Q
Q
2002/2003
(1)

Q
2003/2004
(2)

Q
2002/2003
(3)

Q
2002/2003
(4)

Q
2002/2003
(5)

Q
2002/2003
(6)

Q
2002/2003
(7)

Q
2003/2004
(8)

Intercept

2.917 (0.00)

3.168 (0.00)

2.985 (0.00)

2.738 (0.00)

3.404 (0.00)

3.214 (0.00)

3.609 (0.00)

3.468 (0.00)

LEGAL
Anti-director Rights index
Origin of legal system

0.015 (0.04)

0.011 (0.08)

0.013 (0.09)

0.013 (0.03)

0.013 (0.10)

Independent variables

0.011 (0.11)
0.159 (0.09)
0.172 (0.44)

0.357 (0.02)

INDDIR%
INDDIR%2
ln (INDDIR%)

1.140 (0.03)
-0.823 (0.12)
0.181 (0.02)

0.184 (0.02)

0.186 (0.02)

0.136 (0.05)

0.108 (0.16)

0.042 (0.56)

-0.191 (0.05)
0.117 (0.13)

-0.201 (0.04)
0.101 (0.18)

-0.236 (0.02)
0.135 (0.09)

-0.235 (0.02)
0.129 (0.10)

-0.244 (0.02)
0.127 (0.10)

-0.121 (0.20)
0.060 (0.42)

CF rights
CF rights*LEGAL
CF rights*Anti-director Rights index
CF rights*Origin of legal system

0.005 (0.09)
-0.001 (0.09)

0.004 (0.10)
-0.000 (0.16)

0.005 (0.10)
-0.001 (0.11)

0.005 (0.09)
-0.001 (0.10)

0.005 (0.08)
-0.001 (0.10)

0.009 (0.04)

0.004 (0.10)

0.005 (0.08)
-0.001 (0.15)

ln (sales)
Intangibles/book assets
Sales growth
Need for external financing
Variance in stock returns

-0.139 (0.00)
0.628 (0.43)
0.001 (0.58)
-0.001 (0.82)
-0.479 (0.51)

-0.155 (0.00)
1.006 (0.19)
0.001 (0.43)
-0.001 (0.51)
-0.951 (0.16)

-0.124 (0.00)
0.638 (0.44)
0.001 (0.37)
-0.001 (0.57)
-0.516 (0.47)

-0.118 (0.00)
0.623 (0.45)
0.001 (0.41)
-0.001 (0.61)
-0.602 (0.40)

-0.124 (0.00)
0.439 (0.60)
0.001 (0.31)
-0.001 (0.49)
-0.407 (0.57)

-0.121 (0.00)
0.477 (0.56)
0.001 (0.31)
-0.001 (0.47)
-0.406 (0.58)

-0.118 (0.00)
0.513 (0.54)
0.001 (0.29)
-0.001 (0.49)
-0.442 (0.54)

-0.149 (0.00)
0.828 (0.28)
0.001 (0.24)
-0.001 (0.29)
-0.876 (0.20)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

782
0.0835

782
0.1160

782
0.0920

782
0.0937

770
0.0944

770
0.0941

770
0.0871

770
0.1229

ln (board size)
CROSS-LIST

Industry indicators
Sample size
Adjusted r2

-0.003 (0.05)
-0.001 (0.10)
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Table IV
Regressions of Tobin’s Q on ln (INDDIR%) and control variables for subsamples classified by
LEGAL
This table reports the coefficients and p-values for random country effects regressions using Tobin’s Q as the dependent
variable for different subsamples of 770 industrial firms with a dominant shareholder from 22 countries classified by
LEGAL. A firm has a dominant shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least
10% of the voting rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index
as of 2003, where Anti-director Rights index is an index measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law
and Order index is an index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. A director is considered
independent if that board member is not an employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is not a board
member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have the same family name as the
dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both foreigners, and
(e) is not a member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government. Tobin’s Q is the average 2002-2003 of
(book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book value of assets) and truncated
at 1% and 99%. Percentage cash flow rights are computed as per Appendix A. The natural log of sales and the ratio of
intangible-to-total assets are as of year-end 2003. Sales growth and need for external financing, calculated as the difference
between historical growth of assets and sustainable growth of assets (i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)), are measured over 2002-2003.
The variance of stock returns is calculated with monthly returns over the 24 months 2001-2002. Coefficients are in the
columns. P-values are in parentheses.
Coefficients from country random effects models
LEGAL <20

LEGAL ≥30

LEGAL ≤20

LEGAL >20

Dependent variable = Tobin’s Q 2002/2003
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Intercept

2.418 (0.00)

3.248 (0.00)

2.441 (0.00)

3.522 (0.00)

LEGAL

-0.018 (0.46)

0.015 (0.21)

-0.003 (0.85)

0.005 (0.59)

ln (INDDIR%)

0.280 (0.00)

0.054 (0.71)

0.337 (0.00)

0.112 (0.43)

ln (board size)
CROSS-LIST

-0.077 (0.53)
-0.114 (0.26)

0.042 (0.82)
-0.033 (0.80)

-0.062 (0.61)
0.127 (0.19)

-0.211 (0.26)
0.014 (0.92)

CF rights
CF rights*LEGAL

-0.004 (0.52)
0.001 (0.37)

-0.009 (0.49)
0.000 (0.75)

-0.003 (0.53)
0.001 (0.14)

0.009 (0.39)
-0.001 (0.23)

ln (sales)
Intangibles/book assets
Sales growth
Need for external financing
Variance in stock returns

-0.050 (0.09)
1.743 (0.14)
0.000 (0.55)
-0.001 (0.69)
-1.130 (0.10)

-0.163 (0.00)
-1.870 (0.13)
0.007 (0.02)
0.001 (0.57)
0.985 (0.77)

-0.067 (0.02)
2.062 (0.07)
-0.000 (0.94)
0.000 (0.67)
-0.989 (0.18)

-0.129 (0.00)
-1.737 (0.22)
0.007 (0.00)
-0.000 (0.94)
4.337 (0.23)

YES

YES

YES

YES

381
9
0.1204

226
8
0.2412

508
12
0.1151

262
10
0.2084

Independent variables

Industry indicators
Sample size
Number of countries
Adjusted r2
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Table V
Two-stage instrumental variables regressions of ln (INDDIR%) and Tobin’s Q in firms with a
dominant shareholder
This table reports the coefficients and p-values of simultaneous equations estimated by 2SIV for 770 industrial firms with a
dominant shareholder from 22 countries. The dependent variables are INDDIR% and Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the average
2002-2003 or 2003-2004 of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by (the book
value of assets) and truncated at 1% and 99%. INDDIR% is the percentage of independent directors. A director is
considered independent if that board member is not an employee of the firm and (a) is not the dominant shareholder, (b) is
not a board member in any other company or its subsidiary along the control chain, (c) does not have the same family name
as the dominant shareholder, (d) is not of the same nationality as the dominant shareholder provided they are both
foreigners, and (e) is not a member of government when the dominant shareholder is a government. The instruments for
INDDIR% used in the first stage are the firm’s market model alpha and beta (calculated by Worldscope using 23 and 35
monthly returns). The instruments for Tobin’s Q are the prior year’s Q, logarithm of prior year’s sales, and single-digit SIC
indicators. The coefficients on country indicator variables are included in the models but omitted from the table. A firm has
a dominant shareholder if an individual, family, privately-held firm, or government controls at least 10% of the voting
rights in the firm. LEGAL is the product of the Anti-director Rights index and the Law and Order index as of 2003, where
Anti-director Rights index is an index measuring de jure investor protection from LLSV (1998) and Law and Order index is
an index measuring de facto investor protection from icrgonline.com. Percentage cash flow rights are computed as per
Appendix A. The natural log of sales and the ratio of intangible-to-total assets are as of year-end 2003. Sales growth and
need for external financing, calculated as the difference between historical growth of assets and sustainable growth of assets
(i.e., ROE/(1-ROE)), are measured over 2002-2003. The variance of stock returns is calculated with monthly returns over
the 24 months 2001-2002. Coefficients are in the columns. P-values are in parentheses.
Panel A: Two-equation model estimated for all firms
Coefficients from second stage of 2SIV
Dependent variables
Dependent variables
ln (INDDIR%)
(1)

Q
2002/03
(2)

ln (INDDIR%)
(3)

Q
2003/04
(4)

Intercept

-0.604 (0.01)

3.342 (0.00)

-0.831 (0.00)

4.344 (0.00)

LEGAL

0.008 (0.06)

0.012 (0.13)

0.007 (0.09)

0.004 (0.75)

Tobin’s Q
ln (INDDIR%)

-0.009 (0.77)

ln (board size)
CROSS-LIST

0.125 (0.01)
0.053 (0.22)

-0.164 (0.11)
0.092 (0.26)

0.150 (0.00)
0.042 (0.28)

-0.111 (0.30)
-0.010 (0.93)

Cash flow rights
Cash flow rights* LEGAL

-0.001 (0.54)
-0.001 (0.97)

0.003 (0.27)
-0.001 (0.35)

-0.001 (0.42)
-0.001 (0.89)

0.002 (0.59)
0.001 (0.99)

ln (sales)
Intangible/book assets
Sales growth
Need for external financing
Variance of stock returns

-0.036 (0.01)
0.102 (0.79)
-0.001 (0.75)
-0.002 (0.23)
0.186 (0.59)

-0.113 (0.00)
-0.181 (0.83)
0.001 (0.45)
-0.001 (0.07)
-0.789 (0.29)

-0.032 (0.03)
0.078 (0.84)
-0.001 (0.71)
-0.002 (0.36)
0.241 (0.50)

-0.138 (0.00)
0.180 (0.83)
0.001 (0.50)
-0.001 (0.52)
-1.221 (0.11)

NO

YES

NO

YES

770
0.1392

770
0.1109

770
0.1451

770
0.1609

Independent variables

Industry indicators
Sample size
Adjusted r2

0.052 (0.06)
1.135 (0.00)

0.405 (0.03)
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Panel B: Two-equation model estimated separately for countries with LEGAL < 20 and LEGAL ≥ 30
Coefficients from second stage of 2SIV
Firms with
Firms with
LEGAL < 20
LEGAL ≥ 30
Dependent variables
Dependent variables
ln (INDDIR%)
(1)

Q
2002/03
(2)

ln (INDDIR%)
(3)

Q
2002/03
(4)

Intercept

0.239 (0.85)

2.746 (0.00)

-3.008 (0.00)

3.757 (0.00)

LEGAL

-0.050 (0.53)

0.003 (0.86)

0.080 (0.00)

0.012 (0.37)

Tobin’s Q
ln (INDDIR%)

-0.066 (0.35)

ln (board size)
CROSS-LIST

0.131 (0.07)
0.070 (0.25)

-0.139 (0.26)
-0.140 (0.17)

0.221 (0.03)
0.080 (0.22)

0.036 (0.83)
0.006 (0.92)

Cash flow rights
Cash flow rights* LEGAL

-0.001 (0.74)
0.001 (0.56)

0.001 (0.83)
0.001 (0.73)

-0.001 (0.61)
0.001 (0.72)

-0.001 (0.73)
0.000 (0.97)

ln (sales)
Intangible/book assets
Sales growth
Need for external financing
Variance of stock returns

-0.031 (0.09)
0.054 (0.94)
-0.000 (0.88)
-0.002 (0.00)
0.327 (0.44)

-0.045 (0.06)
1.390 (0.23)
0.001 (0.53)
-0.001 (0.30)
-1.371 (0.04)

-0.058 (0.00)
0.306 (0.54)
-0.001 (0.39)
-0.000 (0.88)
-2.912 (0.07)

-0.178 (0.00)
-1.830 (0.12)
0.008 (0.01)
-0.001 (0.90)
2.663 (0.47)

NO

YES

NO

YES

381
9
0.1192

381
9
0.1037

226
8
0.2120

226
8
0.2195

Independent variables

Industry indicators
Sample size
Number of countries
Adjusted r2

0.007 (0.87)
0.241 (0.15)

0.444 (0.04)
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Appendix A
Data sources for the percentage of equity voting rights owned by the dominant shareholder in 799 firms with a dominant
shareholder from 22 countries
The table reports the sources in the order accessed to collate equity ownership information. For each of an initial 1,455 sample firms, we extract the identity and
percentage of voting rights of each shareholder who holds ≥ 10% of the outstanding voting rights. If such data are available in the first source listed, we use that
source. If not, we move to the next source until we gather data for each firm. If data are unavailable for year-end 2002, we gather data from year-end 2001. If
firms have two or more large shareholders, we examine block affiliation to determine whether combined ownership of voting rights exceeds the single largest
shareholder. If so, these ownership stakes are combined to comprise the single largest shareholder. Using this procedure and moving up the ownership tree we
establish that 1,055 firms had a dominant shareholder, where a dominant shareholder is an individual, a family, a company, or a government that controls at least
10% of the voting rights. The fraction of cash flow rights held by the dominant shareholder is determined by the fraction of cash flow rights held by the dominant
shareholder in the sample firm multiplied by the fraction of voting rights in each firm in the ownership tree.
Country

Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
India
Italy
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
Spain
S. Africa
Sweden
UK
USA

Equity ownership data sources
Company WEB sites; Worldscope; Bloomberg; Major Companies of the Far East and Australasia, http://www.ibisworld.com.au.
www.euronext.com; Major Companies of Europe; Mergent International Manuals; Bloomberg.
Edgar international; Reuters; Bloomberg; Bovespa; Company WEB sites.
FP Survey of Industrials; www.sedar.com; Mergent International Manuals.
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; Copenhagen Stock Exchange; Major Companies of Europe.
www.huginonline.com; Major Companies of Europe; Mergent International Manuals; Company WEB sites.
www.euronext.com; Major Companies of Europe; Company WEB sites; French Company Handbook.
Major Companies of Europe; Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel and Germany’s Top 500; Company WEB sites; Bloomberg.
www.capitallink.com; Major Companies of Europe; Mergent International Manuals; Company WEB sites.
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; Company WEB sites.
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; National Stock Exchange of India; Stock Exchange Board of India
www.consob.it; Bloomberg; Major Companies of Europe.
Japan Company Handbook; Company WEB sites; Bloomberg.
Stock Market Division of the KRX; Reuters; Bloomberg; Company WEB sites.
Bursa Malaysia; Kuala Lumpar Stock Exchange; Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Company WEB sites.
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores; Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Company WEB sites.
Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Major Companies of Europe, Company WEB sites
www.cnmv.es; Major Companies of Europe, Mergent International, Company WEB sites; Bloomberg.
Edgar International; Reuters; Bloomberg; Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
Reuters; Bloomberg; Edgar International; Company WEB sites.
www.hemscott.co.uk; Bloomberg; Worldscope; Mergent International; http://www.itruffle.com.
SEC filings.

